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This paper qualitatively explores the prospects to restore compliance with EU law a-
gainst the rigid and eminently strong resistance of the affected member states. An em-
pirical study of Court cases on incorrect legal transposition of EC directives in Germany 
and the UK reveals that states give in to the European prosecutors early in some ca-
ses, but maintain non-compliance for a longer period in others. This paper demonstra-
tes that policy variables such as the interpretational scope of the disputed element, 
domestic norms, the organizational degree of organized interests, and the strength of 
domestic non-compliance constituencies influence the settlement dynamics of hard 
cases.  
 1. Introduction 
 
Compliance is an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of international law. Em-
pirical studies revealed that ‘almost all states comply with almost all international norms 
almost all the time’ (Henkin 1968).Yet, non-compliance occurs and impairs the power 
of international law. States reacted to non-compliance problems in creating and 
strengthening international institutions, to which they delegated monitoring and adjudi-
cation competencies in order to restore states’ compliance with international law. Hard 
cases of non-compliance, as instances in which states strongly opt for non-compliance 
are often sooner or later referred to international courts or tribunals. The 1992 EFTA 
Court, the COMESA Court, the ECOWAS Court, and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) are such international courts. For hard cases of non-compliance, they can apply 
judicial discourses before they issue rulings (Smith 2000). If non-compliance prevails, 
the European Union just like many other international institutions can enforce judg-
ments with threats of financial or economic sanctions.  
 
Although we observe a wave of legalization on the international level (Abbott et al. 
2000, Abbott and Snidal 2000, Smith 2000), we know very little on how these interna-
tional courts operate and how they perform in restoring compliance. In order to shed 
light on this issue, this paper focuses on the European Union and inquires why some 
cases referred to the European Court of Justice are settled quickly, while others require 
six additional years until compliance can be restored. While power and capacity are 
good predictors for the settlement prospects of cases in early stages of the infringe-
ment procedure (Börzel et al. 2007), these variables cannot sufficiently explain, why 
some ECJ cases are settled quickly while others need additional time (Börzel, Hof-
mann and Panke 2005). As it comes to hard cases of non-compliance that the Euro-
pean Commission sooner or later refers to the Court, country-specific variables such as 
power, capacity or culture loose their explanatory power. The share of votes in the 
Council of Ministers (political power) or the strength of the national economy (economic 
power), the training and motivation of the administrative staff (administrative capacity) 
or the number of domestic veto players (political capacity), as well as the judicial or 
political culture of states do not affect their willingness or their ability to transform non-
compliance into compliance in reaction to the ECJ. States with a continental-Roman 
legal culture such as Germany or Italy are not more responsive to ECJ judicial dis-
courses than states with a common law tradition such as the UK. Powerful states, such 
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 as Germany and France, cannot deter the ECJ from rulings to a stronger extent than 
weak states, such as Luxemburg or Portugal. Likewise, weak states are not more likely 
to shy away from ECJ penalties than their stronger counterparts. Finally, federal states 
with many veto players and a respectively low political capacity such as Belgium or 
Germany are not disabled by their regions when reacting to the ECJ.  
 
This is not too surprising, since there is significant intra-state variation. Each state has 
Court cases which are quickly settled and others requiring several additional years until 
compliance is achieved. Why, for example, is it that the drinking water case against 
Germany was settled within two years after the ECJ referral, while the environmental 
impact assessment case took six years until compliance was restored? How can we 
explain that the compliance was restored in the UK collective redundancy case within 
two years after the ECJ referral, while non-compliance had already persisted for more 
than ten years? The very fact that norm violations had been abolished is puzzling, 
since both countries have high political and economic power in the EU and are, thus 
most likely to be recalcitrant vis-à-vis the Court. In addition, there is no ready-handed 
explanation of why the transformations took place at different speeds, although delays 
clearly hamper the effectiveness of Community law. 
 
This paper inquires into the research question of why some cases are settled quickly 
after the ECJ referral, while others take much longer. It basically argues that policy-
constellations are crucial for the settlement dynamics of non-compliance hard cases. In 
particular, judicial discourses are successful, if state and European advocates share a 
judicial method of interpretation, which additionally fits to the interpretational problem. If 
this policy-specific scope condition is present, judicial discourses succeed in restoring 
compliance with international law – even against the initial strong resistance of the af-
fected states. Judgments do not induce compliance top-down as long as they are not 
complemented by a threat of penalties, which induce compliance only if external non-
compliance costs exceed domestic non-compliance benefits. Hence, ceteris paribus, 
for policies with highly organized strong non-compliance constituencies, the shadow of 
financial sanctions must be darker to be effective in restoring compliance, than for poli-
cies with loosely organized non-compliance proponents.  
 
The paper is organized into four parts. In the next step, it inquires into the operation of 
judicial discourses and sanctions and develops two hypotheses accounting for intra-
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 state variation (II). A series of qualitative studies on the UK and Germany illustrates the 
theoretical claims. In a third step, the British collective redundancy and the German 
drinking water cases are inquired. They are instances in which non-compliance was 
maintained for several years in the infringement procedures, but settled quickly after 
the ECJ referrals (III). By contrast, the German Environmental Impact Assessment and 
the British nitrates case are instances in which compliance was restored not earlier 
than two to three years after the ECJ judgment (IV). The paper demonstrates that 
country-specific capacity variables such as veto players, effectiveness of administrati-
on, financial resources, or power variables such as the share of votes in the Council of 
Ministers or the economic power do not determine the settlement dynamics of hard 
cases of non-compliance. If member states eminently oppose compliance with Europe-
an law, policy-constellations crucially influence, whether the European Court of Justice 
succeeds in restoring compliance. 
 
 
2. Explaining Quick and Slow Transformations 
 
The straightforward answer to the question of why some ECJ cases are settled faster 
than others relates to the applied compliance instruments. Judicial discourses are ap-
plied to each case referred to the ECJ, which usually take two years, followed by bind-
ing judgments, which can be enforced with threats of sanctions, if non-compliance per-
sists for more than two years after the Court ruling. If judicial discourses are effective, 
cases are settled quickly within one to three years after the ECJ referral, if sanctions 
are effective, cases are settled after two to three years after the judgment. Yet, the in-
stitutional design of the EU infringement procedure is constant and judicial discourses, 
judgments and the shadow of penalties is applied to all states equally. Hence, the 
presence and the application of discourses and threats cannot explain, why some 
Court cases are settled quickly and others take longer – even within one and the same 
state. Thus, the important question is, under which conditions judicial discourses and 
judgments are effective in restoring compliance. Why is it that every state has signifi-
cant variation in the settlement dynamics? Why are only some judicial discourses effec-
tive? Why do some judgments require a severe threat of sanctions to be complied 




 For all cases that the European Commission has referred to the ECJ, judicial dis-
courses take place between the national and the European advocate. The highly legal-
ized design of the ECJ facilitates the exchange of arguments, which are considered as 
legitimate speech acts, while bargaining is perceived as contextually inappropriate 
(Alexy 1983, Onuf 1989). In processes of judicial arguing, state and European advo-
cates can choose between different methods of judicial interpretation inquiring into the 
wording of the norm, into its systematic or into its purpose in order to find out, how the 
aim and the scope of the disputed norm should be interpreted. The judicial argumenta-
tion proceeds in a written and an oral stage. In both, European and state advocates 
exchange judicial arguments on what the norm in question is about and where and how 
it should be applied. At the end of the oral procedure after all judicial arguments on 
possible interpretations of the European legal act in questions are exchanged, the 
European Advocate General prepares a written opinion. The written opinion summa-
rizes the arguments made during the judicial discourse and suggests how the ECJ 
judges might decide. The judicial discourse ends with the ECJ judgment, in which the 
ECJ judges decide the case by consensus and, thereby, clearly define the content and 
scope of application of the disputed norm. 
 
Judicial discourses take place in all cases of eminently rigid non-compliance, which the 
European Commission refers to the ECJ, but are not always successful – even for one 
and the same state, for one and the same government or within a policy field. Hence, 
the fact that a judicial discourse takes place cannot explain whether it is successful in 
restoring compliance with EU law or not. This indicates that not every judicial argument 
is per se good and persuades states to comply with a European norm. Thus, the crucial 
question is: What characterizes a good judicial argument? Or put differently: Which 
judicial arguments are likely to change states’ compliance-adverse attitudes in order to 
promote compliance?  
 
In order to answer this question, this paper theoretically draws on a modified version of 
the Habermasian discourse theory that inquires contextual preconditions for collective 
ideational changes. Governments can be talked out of non-compliance, if they undergo 
processes of collective ideational changes that alter their preferences from non-
compliance into compliance. Generally, collective ideational changes are only likely 
under specific conditions related to the flow of ideas (dominant pattern of speech acts) 
and the quality of ideas (shared criteria for the evaluation of the quality of communi-
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 cated ideas) (Panke 2006a). Collective ideational change requires that actors do not 
talk cross-purposes, but can relate to each other. Meaningful communication presup-
poses that all participants share standards of how the quality of speech can be as-
sessed. In meaningful interactions, results (compromises or consensus) to which all 
participants agree can be achieved incrementally (without voting or authoritative deci-
sion). By contrast, if actors do talk cross-purpose, there will be no consensual outcome, 
which is supported by all actors and for which all actors have reasons to comply with.  
 
Truth, rightfulness and appropriateness are three possible standards to assess the 
quality of arguments (Habermas 1995a). If actors share such standards, they can de-
velop consensual perspectives, because they can commonly factor out good from less 
compelling ideas and incrementally arrive at a consensus. The standard of truth en-
compasses epistemological and methodological principles and also ontological ele-
ments. Argumentative interactions, in which the quality of arguments can be measured 
based on standards of truth, are conducive to a consensual norm definition when the 
actors share expertise on the subject matter. However, truth-related reasoning be-
comes meaningless when there is no consensus of whether an effect reproduces or 
reinforces the norm, proper to its content and scope. Thus, a consensus on the pur-
pose of the norm is essential.1 However, for all ECJ referrals contents and/or scope of 
the respective norm are most likely contested. Yet, actors are not trapped in the di-
lemma that they can only develop a consensual norm definition when they consent on 
the purpose of a norm, while the very fact that the case has been carried on to the 
Court indicates that such a consensus is absent. The judicial discourse offers an expe-
dient: It aims at the clarification of the contents and scopes of disputed norms and thus 
of the standard of rightness itself. In order to identify and clarify a norm’s contents and 
scope, judicial methods of interpretation are applied (e.g. wording, systematic or teleo-
logical heuristics) and can serve as additional yardsticks to measure commonly the 
quality of arguments. The wording heuristic aims at solving interpretational differences 
by analyzing the wording of the paragraphs in question: Are new concepts introduced? 
How are they defined? Are exceptions named and enumerated? The systematic heu-
ristic solves interpretational questions by analyzing the paragraph or article in question 
in the context of the whole legal norm: Are new concepts introduced in other para-
                                                
 
1  Norms are expression of a common interest of the norm-producing actors (Habermas 1992, Habermas 
1995b) and the quality of normative ideas is measured by the extent to which they express the pur-
pose of a norm, as the standard for rightfulness (Habermas 1995a: 42). 
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 graphs that define or delimit the issue in question? Are exceptions in other parts of the 
norm named and enumerated and do they impact scope and content of the interpreta-
tional issue? The teleological heuristic aims at defining content and scope of a disputed 
norm or paragraph by analyzing the broader legal context: What is the purpose of the 
treaties and how does it relate to the norm in question? Although judicial discourses 
take always place, their success in restoring compliance varies. Hence, judicial dis-
courses can only be effective and induce compliance, if actors do not talk cross-
purposes, but share common standards for the evaluation of communicated argu-
ments. Shared judicial methods of interpretation (judicial heuristics, e.g. wording, his-
torical, systematic, teleological) serve as additional evaluative standards (which were 
not present in the management phase). During the judicial discourse, a shared judicial 
heuristic serves as a standard on which the goodness of ideas on how to interpret a 
norm’s content and scope can be commonly evaluated. If actors equally factor out 
good from less compelling ideas, they can finally arrive at a consensus. Hence, if 
shared, judicial interpretational heuristics allow actors to develop new insights on how 
the contents or scope of a norm have to be understood and contribute to the funneling 
of consensual norm interpretations. 
 
Yet, not every judicial heuristic is suited to solve every interpretational problem. In or-
der to select a single interpretation out of the variety of possible norm readings, a high 
goodness of fit between the interpretational scope of the norm and the seizure of the 
shared heuristic is required. A narrow interpretational heuristic (such as the wording 
heuristic) might not produce a single interpretation, for all issues with broad interpreta-
tional scopes (since different articles interpreted according to their wording can lead to 
completely different interpretations of the whole norm and there is no way of deciding 
which article should be given priority out of the variety of wording based interpretation). 
Disputed elements with broad interpretational scopes are better dealt with broader heu-
ristics (teleological, systematical), because they allow developing a comprehensive 
reading of the whole norm. Respectively, contested issues with narrow interpretational 
scopes are best dealt with by narrow heuristics. Narrow heuristics allow dealing with 
problems of detail, while broad heuristics applied to a norm with a narrow interpreta-
tional scope multiply the number of possible readings broadening content and scope 
ex-post. This is not conducive to a successful consensual funneling process, since it 
jeopardizes the explicitly defined scope. Successful judicial discourses require, firstly, 
that actors share a judicial heuristic and, secondly, that the shared heuristic has a high 
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 goodness of fit with the interpretational problem at hand. If both conditions are met, 
European and national advocates can develop a consensual norm definition regarding 
aims, procedures, and applicatory scope of the formerly contested norm. During suc-
cessful judicial discourses actors become persuaded that the new consensual norm 
definition is better (or more adequate) than a previously upheld norm definition. These 
processes of persuasion facilitate compliance: if governments change their attitudes 
inherent in a certain norm (which were responsible for non-compliance in the first place 
or were used to publicly justify non-compliance), they have no longer non-compliance 
incentives. 
 
In a nutshell, the application of judicial heuristics provides opportunities for consensual 
norm funneling and restoring compliance, which were absent in the interactions prior to 
the ECJ referral. Yet, judicial discourses can only develop a consensual norm interpre-
tation if the actors share a judicial heuristic fitting to the interpretational problem at 
stake. Only if this independent variable is present, actors do not talk cross purposes 
but commonly sort good and convincing judicial arguments from less convincing argu-
ments, which, in turn, facilitate processes of mutual persuasion leading to a consensual 
norm definition. The hypothesis on the success of judicial discourses states: H1: Con-
sensual norm interpretations that quickly facilitate compliance are likely, if actors share 
a judicial heuristic that reveals a high goodness of fit to the interpretational problem at 
hand. 
 
If judicial discourses fail, transformational processes do not take place quickly and non-
compliance is maintained for an additional period. This is, because judgments do not 
directly induce compliance top-down. They transport no new arguments, which have 
not already been made during the judicial discourse and can therefore not restore 
compliance via processes of persuasion. At the same time, judgments are not threaten-
ing to states in increasing non-compliance costs. They are not automatically linked to 
financial sanctions and do not facilitate reputational losses on the EU level, simply be-
cause all states face adverse-ECJ judgments at some point. Only if non-compliance 
prevails for more than a year after the judgment, a top-down enforcement instrument 
comes into play and restores compliance with a delay.  
 
Although the shadow of sanctions is present for all cases on which the ECJ issued 
judgments, the threat of sanctions is only effective in facilitating transformations into 
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 compliance, if states take them seriously and perceive the costs for future non-
compliance as exceeding domestic non-compliance benefits (Fearon 1998, Horne and 
Cutlip 2002). Within the first year after the ECJ judgment, the shadow of possible sanc-
tions is still bright. Since European actors do not introduce first enforcement measures 
in this period, governments do not shy away from sanctions immediately after the ECJ 
ruling (Panke 2006b). Even highly risk-adverse governments value non-compliance 
benefits of today stronger than avoiding non-compliance costs in the remote future, 
when they might not even be in office anymore. Although a shared reference system 
on what constitutes bargaining power is most likely present, threats with sanctions are 
too weak to facilitate the adaptation of strategic positions and unstable compliance 
within the first year after ECJ rulings. 
 
As the shadow of financial penalties darkens, since first measures towards enforce-
ment have been introduced by European actors, the distinction between centralized 
and decentralized enforcement systems becomes important. Comparing the implica-
tions of a reasoned opinion based on Art. 228 ECT (after 1993) and a referral to Art 
171 ECT (before 1993), the likelihood that non-compliance costs are increased and 
exceed non-compliance benefits is lower for decentralized sanctions. It is uncertain 
whether other states will indeed react to losses of reputation and credibility and it is 
unclear, in which negotiations in the Council of Ministers losses in reputation negatively 
affect the bargaining power of a state. Moreover, decentralized sanctions might take 
place with a severe time lag and punish subsequent governments rather than those 
responsible for the maintenance of non-compliance in the first place. By contrast, the 
consequences for non-compliant governments are more concrete in centralized en-
forcement systems. If states do not adapt legal acts at all within the average time pe-
riod of two after the first ECJ judgment, the European Commission sends a second 
reasoned opinion to the respective state (Commission of the European Communities 
2005). This increases the likelihood of being sanctioned within the next twelve months 
severely, although there are still two further steps (second ECJ referral and second 
judgment) until non-compliant governments face financial penalties. External non-
compliance costs increase additionally, if the European Commission suggests a sum 
as daily penalty to the ECJ.  
 
For all cases in the enforcement stage of the EU infringement proceeding, policy inter-
ests and strategic positions at stake are eminently strong, since the state would have 
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 already given in an earlier stage of the infringement procedure. This indicates that do-
mestic non-compliance benefits are high. Nevertheless, there can be variation. The 
stronger the domestic non-compliance clientele is organized, the higher are domestic 
non-compliance benefits, while policy characteristics, in turn, influence the organiza-
tional degree and strength of societal norm proponents and norm opponents. A strong 
domestic non-compliance constituency can especially be expected if a certain policy 
issue has concrete compliance costs, but only diffuse compliance benefits (Wilson 
1975). 
 
Taken together, threats of sanctions are the more effective, the more likely they exert 
punishments while the government is still in office. The mere possibility of sanctions in 
the remote future hardly increases non-compliance costs, and it is unlikely that they 
override domestic non-compliance benefits, especially if the domestic non-compliance 
constituency is strong. Only if first steps towards sanctions are undertaken (e.g. if the 
Commission sends a letter of formal notice), future sanctions turn increasingly into ex-
ternal costly constraints to governmental non-compliance. The threat of penalties be-
comes prohibitive, if the Commission suggests a certain sum as daily penalty to the 
ECJ. The compliance re-storing instrument ‘threat of sanctions’ alters strategic cost-
benefit calculations. If external non-compliance costs exceed domestic benefits, gov-
ernments adapt strategic positions accordingly. Governments pursue delayed compli-
ance. Since they quickly abolish the continuation of non-compliance, minimalist 
changes more effectively prevent the ECJ from issuing a financial penalty. The hy-
pothesis on sanctions as compliance re-storing instrument, thus, states: H2: Strategic 
adaptations of governmental positions facilitating delayed compliance are expected 
after judgments, if threats of sanctions are likely to be realized in the near future and if 
non-compliance benefits are not equally high because domestic non-compliance con-




 3. Early Settlements of ECJ Cases 
 
This section focuses on early settlements. Using a most different systems design in 
regard to country-variables, it inquires into the German drinking water and the British 
collective redundancy cases. Governmental non-compliance interests were strong, so 
that non-compliance prevailed for eleven (UK) and seven (Germany) years before the 
European Commission finally referred the cases to the Court. In front of the ECJ, judi-
cial discourses took place. Since the advocates shared judicial heuristics fitting to the 
interpretational problems at hand, the hypothesis expects that non-compliance was 
quickly restored in both instances.  
 
The drinking water directive (DWD, 80/778) aimed to protect both, the environment and 
public health. Therefore, it formulated 64 emission based quality standards that water 
must fulfill, in order to be suited for human consumption. The DWD created a misfit to 
German water aquis in two regards. The polluters-pay principle was strongly institu-
tionalized in Germany but not prescribed in the directive and the DWD incorporated 
environmental parameters, which were not part of the German public health-oriented 
water legislation (Bundestag 1988d, Bundestag 1987, Bundestag 1988b, Bundestag 
1990, Börzel 2003: 76-81, Knill 2001: 134). The conservative/liberal Kohl-government 
opposed the environmental parameters because of cost implications for water suppliers 
who were ultimately responsible for achieving the quality standards (c.f. Börzel 2003: 
81, Bundestag 1989, Bundesregierung 1988). Hence, Germany was reluctant to com-
ply with the DWD. The environmental parameters were not legally transposed in the 
1986 drinking water regulations (DWR) and the exceptional clause for granting depar-
tures had been interpreted extensively, which restricted the DWD’s scope of applica-
tion. Already in 1987, the Commission opened an infringement proceeding (1987/0440) 
and accused the Federal Republic for incorrectly legally transposing the DWD. The 
Kohl-government had strong non-compliance preferences and dispute continued, so 
that the Commission referred the case to the ECJ in 1990 (237/90). 
 
Two issues were at stake in the judicial discourse. Firstly, the advocates disputed un-
der which conditions exceptions form the DWD can be granted and secondly, whether 
and how all exceptions and derogations have to be communicated to the public and the 
European Commission. The following discussion focuses on the second issue, for 
which non-compliance was maintained a couple of months longer.  
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In the first phase of the judicial discourse, dissent on whether all derogations and ex-
ceptions from the water quality standards have to be communicated prevailed, since 
the European and the German advocate did not commonly apply a judicial heuristic 
with a high goodness of fit to the interpretational problem at hand.2 Hence, the 1990 
drinking water regulation did not require comprehensive information and communica-
tion measures. After the 1990 reform, the judicial discourse shifted substantially from 
the abstract question of whether communicational requirements should be legally pre-
scribed in Germany, to the issue of whether derogations and exceptions based reasons 
related to the texture of the soil (geogen) must also be communicated to the Commis-
sion, or whether the information responsibilities encompasses only those derogations 
and exceptions from the directive, which were caused by climatic ‘emergencies’.  
 
The German advocate aimed to justify the exception of geogen causes from communi-
cational requirements in the 1990 DWR with reference to the wording of Article 9 I of 
the DWD (Advocate General 1992: 19). The wording of Article 9 I DWD states: 
“Member States may make provision for derogations from this Directive in order 
to take account of: (a) situations arising from the nature and structure of the 
ground in the area from which the supply in question emanates. Where a Mem-
ber State decides to make such a derogation, it shall inform the Commission 
                                                
 
2  This was, firstly, because the shared wording instrument did not fit of the interpretational 
problem and, secondly, because they did not share the broader method of judicial interpre-
tation such as the directive-immanent teleological heuristic. The text of the DWD lacked an 
explicit rule in regard to legal requirements of notifications and communications of granted 
exceptions form the DWD’s quality parameters. Consequently, a shared wording heuristic 
could not be applied successfully in facilitating a single reading of the interpretational prob-
lem. The text of the DWD was silent in this regard, so that the wording heuristic allows for 
two conclusions. Firstly, and that was the German argumentative strategy, one can con-
clude from the fact that the text of the DWD is silent, that the DWD does not require certain 
legally binding communicational mechanisms, but that the choice of how to achieve ‘whole-
some communication’ is entirely up to the member states. Secondly, the European advocate 
argued that very fact that the wording heuristic produces no clear definition can also be in-
terpreted as indication that a certain communicational mechanism might not be the only op-
tion for legal transpositions. It cannot be concluded that every transposition is equally good, 
only because the wording is silent. Hence, competing interpretations could have been main-
tained and the wording instrument did not allow singling out the better from the worse inter-
pretation. While the less narrow directive-immanent teleological method of interpretation had 
a much better fit to the interpretational problem at hand and, in turn, might have provided a 
single interpretation, it was not shared by the German advocate. Hence, the first stage of 
the judicial discourse regarding the issue of communicational requirements is an instance, in 
which the actors shared a judicial heuristic (wording), which did not fit to the interpretational 
problem, while they did not commonly apply a broader judicial heuristic with a better fit to 
the interpretational problem at hand. 
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 accordingly within two months of its decision stating the reasons for such dero-
gation; (b) situations arising from exceptional meteorological conditions. Where 
a Member State decides to make such a derogation, it shall inform the Com-
mission accordingly within 15 days of its decision stating the reasons for this 
derogation and its duration.” 
 
Based on the wording heuristic, Germany concluded that derogations can be granted 
because of geogen reasons, and did no longer deny the necessity of communicational 
requirements in this respect.  
 
The European advocate also applied the wording heuristic to the DWD and pointed out 
that Article 9 I a allows granting specific but not general derogations based on geogen 
factors (Advocate General 1992: 20). The European advocate additionally argued that 
the wording of the directive does not allow granting general derogations for reasons 
related to the texture of the soil, so that all granted derogations must be communicated 
to the European Commission (Advocate General 1992: 20). 
 
The wording heuristic had a high goodness of fit as regards to the issue of granting 
exceptions form the DWD for reasons related to the texture of the soil. Using the word-
ing instrument, the European advocate concluded that derogations due to geogen rea-
sons are possible, but since derogations are ‘exceptions’ they have to be communi-
cated to the European Commission. The German advocate did not challenge this word-
ing-based conclusion. Even if Germany would have tried to defend non-communication 
of general exceptions due to soil-related reasons with the wording instrument, it would 
have failed. This is because the wordings of Article 9 I a and Article 10 II clearly and 
unambiguously specify the reasons for possible derogations with geogen or excep-
tional meteorological conditions. These Articles state that both types of possible must 
be communicated to the European Commission. Since neither wording nor directive-
immanent teleological judicial heuristic would have allowed successfully defending the 
original German position, it is not surprising that Germany stopped defending lacking 
communicational requirements for derogations and, consequently, accepted that the 




 In line with the hypothesis the German government changed its substantial policy inter-
ests in response to the late stage of the judicial discourse and opted quickly for compli-
ance. In order to abolish non-compliance, the Kohl-government initiated a legally bind-
ing provision entailing communicational requirements, in order to meet the criteria as 
required based on Articles 9 and 10 of the DWD already towards the end of the judicial 
discourse (Federal Ministry for Health 1992: 1). The DWP ensured the comprehensive 
communication of exceptions and derogations as well as their circumstances from local 
authorities to the federal ministry for health (Federal Ministry for Health 1992: 1, 6). 
Especially the Christian Democrats’ in Bundestag and Bundesrat opposed the com-
plete communication of deviations to the DWD quality parameters (Bayern 1992, 
Bundesrat 1992). Even the Committee for Health of the Bundesrat was less empathic 
towards the ECJ judgment than the Kohl-government and suggested scope restrictions 
to the communicational requirements in the governmental draft DWP 
(Bundesratsausschuss für Gesundheit 1992: 2, Bundesrat 1992: 487). Against this 
resistance, the federal government managed to pass the DWP in December 1992. 
Within less than one year of the ECJ judgment, the Kohl-government induced a legal 
change that completely and precisely legally transposed the norm definition as devel-
oped during the late stage of the judicial discourse before the ECJ.  
 
The Kohl-government and the Töpfer-environmental ministry pushed for such a fast 
legal change, because they changed their substantial policy interests in reaction to the 
judicial arguments. Already towards the end of the judicial discourse, federal decision-
makers stated that the DWD is of high quality and should be implemented because of 
its importance for the prevention of environmental and health damages (e.g. Bundestag 
1992). This is stark contrast to the arguments prominent in 1989, were the scientific 
and technological basis of the DWD was severely attacked from all sides (e.g. 
Bundestag 1988c, Bundesregierung 1988, Bundestag 1988a). Rather than opting for a 
narrow drinking water quality approach with broad exceptional clauses and intranspar-
ent derogations, the government was keen to emphasize that environmental concerns 
are important for water quality issues in general and specifically for the maintenance of 
Germany’s high water quality standards (Federal Ministry for Health 1992, Bundestag 
1993a, Bundestag 1993a, Bundestag 1994b, Bundestag 1994b, Bundestag 1994a, 
Bundesregierung 1994, Bundesregierung 1993). While drinking water issues were de-
bated in terms of public health in the German Bundestag before the ECJ judicial dis-
course, drinking water quality was regarded as an issue of environmental protection 
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 afterwards (Bundestag 1993a, Bundestag 1993a, Bundestag 1994b, Bundestag 1994b, 
Bundestag 1994a, Bundesregierung 1994, Bundesregierung 1993). Accordingly, the 
distinction between rightful health-related quality parameter and ‘unnecessary’ envi-
ronmental-protection related parameters was no longer maintained and the possibilities 
for broad exceptions and intransparent derogations were severely limited (Bundestag 
1993a, Bundestag 1994c).3 Thus, non-compliance was quickly abolished only two 
years after the European Commission referred to case to the ECJ. 
 
The collective redundancy directive (75/129) protects employees in the event of collec-
tive redundancies through prescribing consultations with employee’s representatives 
and official protective procedures. In 1985, the conservative government substantially 
altered the UK’s initial legal implementation (the Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 
1975). After the European Commission became aware of this change, it suspected that 
the 1985 EPA only incompletely legally transposed the directive, since information and 
consultation of trade unions through employers were ultimately voluntary and because 
the protective rights did only apply for some but not all redundancies (European Com-
mission 1991). Therefore, the Commission issued a reasoned opinion in March 1991. 
Yet, the Conservative government upheld its claim of not violating EU law, mainly be-
cause employer associations as important conservative clientele severely opposed the 
                                                
 
3  A counter factual argument also indicates that a governmental change of substantial policy 
interests is more likely than strategic adaptation of positions to increasing external costly 
constraints. Conservatives and Liberals in both chambers overwhelmingly opposed the 
DWD in fall and winter 1991 (Bundestag 1991a Bundestag 1991c, Bundestag 1991b). 
Against the background of non-compliance preferences in the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, 
among the chemical industry, and the agricultural lobby (Bundestag 1991b, Bundestag 
1993b), the federal government could have easily delayed strategic adaptations until the 
costs for non-compliance became compulsory high – which would have been more likely af-
ter the ruling was issued. Yet, the very fact that the conservative federal government pushed 
for a legal adaptation completely in line with the consensual norm interpretation already be-
fore the ECJ judgment, although the domestic opposition was strong, shows that a change 
of substantial policy interests took place. Moreover, after the ECJ judgment, the German 
federal health authority (BGA), which had extensive contacts to water providers, opposed 
the 1990 DWR and the 1992 DWP and campaigned for ignoring some of the parameters (in-
terview federal ministry 08/03/05). The BGA feared that comprehensive monitoring and 
communicational system will highlight all instances of poor drinking water quality and, in 
turn, increase pressures on the BGA, local authorities, and water suppliers or even lead to 
additional EU infringement proceedings for failures of practical implementation of the DWD. 
The health ministry did not use the skepticism of the BGA as a window of opportunity to shift 
back into a less demanding drinking water quality approach, but reacted promptly with 
threats of dismissals in order to bring the BGA in line with compliance (interview federal min-
istry 08/03/05). This is in line with its changed policy interests: The government no longer 
accepted that the BGA strategies of promoting lax applications but reacted in a fast and 
straight forward manner to eradicate non-compliance with public health and environmental 
parameters. 
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 directive (c.f. House of Commons 1989, House of Commons 1991). In 1992, the Euro-
pean Commission referred the case to the ECJ. Before the Court, four issues were at 
stake: Should employees be protected by the directive for redundancies in general or 
only for redundancies for economic reasons? Are consultation procedures between the 
employer and workers’ representatives compulsory or voluntary? Which penalties for 
non-compliant employers are prohibitive? Are employers required to merely inform 
workers’ representative of the conditions of redundancies or do they have to engage in 
consultations? 
 
In all four issues, the advocates of the parties consented on applied heuristics. For rea-
sons of scope, this paper focuses on one of the two very problematic issues, namely 
the nature of involvement of workers representative’s into the process of dealing with 
collective redundancies. It was contested whether an employer could easily reject the 
worker representative’s attitudes during the consultation procedure or whether the 
worker representation has real bargaining power and enforceable rights. This affects 
the very heart of the directive’s protective aim. The employee protection would be 
much weaker in processes of collective redundancies, if worker representatives had a 
voice, which employers could de facto completely ignore. Such a lax interpretation of 
the collective redundancies directive would jeopardize the directive’s protective pur-
pose (as defined by a more demanding interpretation). For more than 10 years before 
the ECJ referral, the Conservative Party strongly opposed collective protection rights of 
workers, because they did not fit to the conservative liberal economic approach (House 
of Commons 1989: 475, House of Commons 1991: 476, House of Commons 1992: 
172, Ashford 1981: 101-114). 
 
During the judicial discourse, the European and UK advocates shared the wording heu-
ristic. The wording interpretation of the collective redundancies directive and the British 
legal act revealed that Article 2 I of the collective redundancies directive precisely pre-
scribes the aim of information and consultation endeavors of employee representatives 
and employers as reaching an agreement (European Court of Justice 1994: 34-36). 
The subsequent paragraph (Article 2 II) states that consultations "shall, at least, cover 
ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of wor-
kers affected, and mitigating the consequences". However, section 99 VII of the British 
Employment Protection Act was less demanding since employers could reject the posi-
tions of employee representatives as long as he stated his reasons. The wording in-
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 strument fitted well to the interpretational problem. Regardless of whether one would 
start with Article 2 I or with Article 2 II of the directive, the wording heuristic suggests 
that the directive clearly stated aims for information and consultation procedures 
(European Court of Justice 1994: 35). Hence, the judicial discourse hypothesis expects 
that the UK government changed its substantial policy interests in reaction to the judi-
cial discourse and accepted a broader and more demanding reading of the collective 
redundancy directive in general and of the status of collective rights in the process of 
redundancies in particular. 
 
Already during the ongoing judicial discourse, the UK government introduced legal 
changes in the Trade Union Reform and Employment Act (TUREA) (Advocate General 
1994: 34). In general, the TUREA fitted well to the liberal economic approach of the 
conservative government and abolished several elementary trade union rights. Yet, 
contrary to the general trend and its general economic policy, the conservative gov-
ernment explicitly incorporated into the TUREA that in cases of collective redundancies 
employer and worker representatives shall aim for an agreement in consultations 
(House of Commons 1993). Thereby, the government extended collective protective 
rights in line with the arguments made during the judicial discourse (House of Com-
mons 1993). This is surprising, since employers’ associations (e.g. the Confederation 
of British Industry) as the Conservative government’s clientele strongly opposed collec-
tive worker rights for their cost implications before and after the ECJ judicial discourse 
(compare House of Commons 1992 with House of Commons 1996a, House of Com-
mons 1994b, c.f. Docksey 1986). Although the strategic environment and the domestic 
distribution of benefits and costs remained stable in the UK, the conservative govern-
ment changed its policies as regards the worker representation in collective redun-
dancy processes during the judicial discourse. Before the judicial discourse took place, 
the government applied a liberal economic cost-benefit frame and highlighted costs for 
the economy resulting from newly introduced protective rights regarding redundancies 
(House of Commons 1991, House of Commons 1992). By contrast, after the judicial 
discourse, the government applied a frame of rightfulness and supported the inclusion 
of workers representatives in processes of collective redundancies (House of Com-
mons 1993: 327).  
“We reached a point of considerable uncertainty where it looked as though an 
employer had to consult in cases of collective redundancy only if there were a 
recognised trade union. If there were no recognised trade union, the employer 
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 was apparently under no obligation to consult anyone, which cannot be right. 
The ECJ must be supported in its judgment. Tonight we are trying to ensure 
that, in the case of collective redundancies, everyone is consulted, either 
through a recognised trade union or through an election” (Minister for Competi-
tion and Consumer Affairs (Mr. John M. Taylor) in House of Commons 1996a: 
205).  
 
In the wake of the unaltered strong domestic opposition of employer associations vis-à-
vis a demanding interpretation of the directive, it is not only remarkable that the gov-
ernment changed its policies on worker representatives already during the late stage of 
the judicial discourse, but also that the government pursued this legal change without 
blame shifting to the EU or ECJ (House of Commons 1993; House of Commons 1994b: 
432). If the UK government would have maintained its substantial policy interest for 
non-compliance, but adapted strategic cost-benefit calculations to losses in reputation 
vis-à-vis the Commission, vis-à-vis other member states, or to the shadow of future 
penalties, it would have been strategically rational to avoid domestic reputational 
losses and losses in support of its own clientele. Blame shifting to the EU-level high-
lighting that the EU and not the UK government was ultimately responsible for the 
strengthening of collective rights would have allowed the UK government to avoid rising 
external costs for non-compliance and at the same time justify the extension of collec-
tive rights against the preferences of their clientele and avoid high domestic compli-
ance costs. Yet, the conservative government did not engage in blame shifting to the 
ECJ and also abstained from highlighting the compliance-cost and -benefit implications 
of legal changes. The conservative government even defended the 1993 and 1995 
legal changes as compatible with their deregulative macro economic approach and 
their general skepticism vis-à-vis trade unions (House of Commons 1994b, House of 
Commons 1996a). In line with substantial changes of policy interests, the conservative 
government avoided overlaps between the 1993 TUREA and the 1995 regulation and 
other bodies of employment law, abstained from inserting broad exceptions into both 
legal acts, and did not introduce ambiguity in relying on undefined, underspecified or 
completely new and complex concepts. Hence, in 1995, only one year after the ECJ 
ruling, the collective redundancies directive was correctly legally transposed and could 
finally be completely reproduced – although the conservative government had previ-




Comparing both cases, it is, firstly, remarkable that judicial discourses facilitated 
compliance, although the governmental opposition to demanding interpretations of the 
directives were strong for eleven (UK) and for seven (Germany) years prior to the ECJ 
referral. In addition, in the German drinking water case and in the British collective re-
dundancy cases, governmental constituencies opposed demanding interpretations of 
the disputed directives from the very beginning and continued to do so even after the 
end of the judicial discourse. In both instances, the governments in London and Berlin 
opted for compliance with the consensual norm definition, despite domestic resistance. 
At the same time, there were no external non-compliance costs arising from EU-level 
losses of reputation or from threats of the European Commission or the ECJ (c.f. 
Panke 2007). In both instances, the shadow of external sanctions was bright, since the 
Commission did not introduce first steps towards enforcement with a second infringe-
ment procedure. Moreover, the DWD and the collective redundancy directive were also 
violated by other member states, and every member state had already been subject to 
an adverse ECJ judgment, so that the Kohl and the Major government were not threa-
tened by losses of reputation on the EU-level. As expected by the judicial discourse 
hypotheses, compliance was quickly restored, because the advocates shared judicial 
methods of interpretation fitting to the contested issues. Thus, the German and the 
British governments were talked out of non-compliance and introduced domestic chan-
ges based on the consensual norm definition soon after the ECJ referral.  
 
Secondly, the most different systems design allows concluding that country-variables 
did not matter. Germany and the UK differ in regard to their political capacities (number 
of veto players), their political cultures (majoritarian v consensual), their legal cultures 
(common law v continental), or the popular support rates for EU-integration. Despite all 
these differences, which are prominent in the state of the art (c.f. Mitchell 1996), the 
settlement dynamics of the German drinking water case and the UK collective redun-
dancy case do not differ. While state-variables matter in early stages of infringement 
procedures (Börzel et al. 2007), they do not in adjudication settings. Once cases are 
referred to international courts, state-differences are mitigated and compliance can be 
quickly restored through discursive means, if the policy-specific scope conditions are 
present, so that actors do not talk cross-purposes but arrive at a consensual norm defi-
nition.  
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 4. Late Settlements of ECJ Cases  
 
This section focuses on cases, in which non-compliance was maintained for more than 
two years after the judicial discourse was finished and the ECJ issued its judgment. It 
also applies a most different systems design and compares the British nitrates case 
and the German environmental impact assessment cases. 
 
The nitrates directive (91/676) seeks to protect the environment in reducing the level of 
nitrates in fresh and groundwater. It especially focuses on nitrates from agricultural 
sources, which is the main water polluter. The directive prescribes the designation of 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) and Action Programs as instruments to protect water 
from nitrates. The UK legally transposed the directive with three regulations in 1996 
(“The Protection of Water Against Agricultural Nitrate Pollution Regulations”). However, 
instead of applying the nitrates directive to all groundwater and freshwater, the regula-
tions only referred to drinking water. This scope restriction was in line with the widely 
held British perception of the early and mid 1990ies that water quality is not an envi-
ronmental but a public health issue (House of Commons 1994a: 9, House of Commons 
1996b:814-815, House of Commons 1997).  
 
The European Commission referred the case to the ECJ in February 1999 (case C-
69/99). Before Court, it was firstly contested, whether all surface waters and groundwa-
ter are subject to the nitrates directive, or only water intended for human consumption. 
Secondly, there was dissent on whether the UK failed to designate sufficient nitrate 
vulnerable zones and, thereby, restricted the applicatory scope of the nitrates directive. 
Thirdly, the actors disagreed whether the British action programs that are required for 
the NVZs were sufficient. The judicial discourse remained ineffective. In none of the 
three issues, the European and the British advocate applied common judicial heuristics 
fitting to the interpretational problem at hand. In fact, the British advocate did not apply 
judicial heuristics at all.  Hence, after the ECJ ruled that the UK violated EU law in in-
correctly transposing the nitrates directive into national legal acts in 2000 (European 
Court of Justice 2000), the UK undertook not even first steps towards the legal and 
practical implementation of the judgment, but continued non-compliance (c.f. House of 
Commons 2002e, House of Commons 2002h, House of Commons 2002f).  
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 The second hypothesis expects that governments adapt strategic positions to rising 
external non-compliance costs and opt for delayed compliance, if external costs over-
ride domestic non-compliance benefits. This requires that the threat of penalties is emi-
nently strong so that the government can expect to be punished in the near future, 
while being still in office. In addition, external non-compliance costs override domestic 
benefits the easier, the less organized the domestic non-compliance constituency is. 
 
In the immediate period after the judgment, external non-compliance costs were rela-
tively low, since the European Commission did not introduce first steps towards central-
ized enforcement. At the same time, domestic non-compliance benefits were consid-
erably (Farmers Guardian 2000, The Express 2001a, The Daily Telegraph 2000, 
House of Commons 2000, House of Commons 1999). Farmers as domestic non-
compliance proponents were highly organized and received broad public support, not 
the least because of the BSE crisis and the foot and mouth disease. As expected, the 
Blair-government maintained its compliance-adverse strategic position and did not in-
troduce any preparatory steps towards domestic change (House of Commons 2000, 
House of Commons 2001). Despite the government repeatedly committed itself to a 
more demanding nitrates approach in Court (Advocate General 2000, European Court 
of Justice 2000), non-compliance was continued and the UK remained inactive for an 
additional year. 
 
The European Commission reacted to non-compliance in sending a letter of formal 
notice to the UK in fall 2001 (Farmers Guardian 2001, Belfast Newsletter 2001, The 
Express 2001b, The Daily Telegraph 2001). This increased external non-compliance 
costs, in particular because a second ECJ judgment issuing financial penalties was 
only two procedural steps away. While it became increasingly likely for the Blair-
government to become convicted and penalized while being still in office, the domestic 
non-compliance benefits were still very strong. This was not the least due to fact that 
farmers were well organized and received wide public attention and support. At the 
same time, environmental activists as societal compliance proponents were relatively 
inactive, so that the domestic cost-benefit calculation still strongly pointed towards 
maintaining non-compliance. It is most likely that domestic compliance costs (primarily 
for farmers, but also the reputation vis-à-vis the broader public) almost equaled rising 
external non-compliance costs after the European Commission sent a the letter of for-
mal notice the governmental perception (House of Commons 2001, House of Com-
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 mons 2002a: 426). In line with this interpretation, the Blair government was very reluc-
tant to introduce delayed compliance in winter 2001/2002 (House of Lords 2001). At 
the same time, the government was no longer inactive, but prepared for the initiation of 
a consultation process with farmers on the designation of NVZs. This endeavor was 
publicly labeled as a preparatory step towards legal change (House of Lords 2001, 
House of Commons 2001). Yet, this de facto delayed domestic legal changes even 
further. The ECJ had not only already specified content and scope of the nitrates direc-
tive, so that consultations with farmers were not necessary to legally transpose the 
nitrated directive correctly and completely into UK law. The government also changed 
the options for the consultation during the ongoing process, without starting a new con-
sultations or at least providing farmers with an update on the options, which rendered 
the consultation obsolete (Department of the Environment 2002b). Since the consulta-
tions were neither required nor consequently pursued, the consultation endeavor had a 
window dressing character. This could indicate that the government wanted to demon-
strate its new commitment regarding nitrates in order to prevent the European Com-
mission from initiating another step towards financial penalties, while saving domestic 
compliance costs at least temporarily. 
 
The European Commission was not satisfied with this domestic change, sent a second 
reasoned opinion to the UK, and proposed a sum of as daily penalty (135 000 £) in 
May 2002 (House of Commons 2002c, Financial Times 2002b, Financial Times 2002a, 
Financial Times 2002a, Western Daily Press 2002). This increased the external non-
compliance costs tremendously, since an ECJ judgment issuing the proposed penalty 
was not only very likely, but also very likely to happen so soon that the government 
would still be in office, while being penalized. The domestic non-compliance benefits 
were still high, but did not exceed the threat of external penalties. Hence, the second 
hypothesis expects that changes in strategic positions take place so that delayed com-
pliance was achieved.  
 
In line with the second hypothesis, cost-benefit calculations changed. Delayed compli-
ance became more beneficial than maintaining non-compliance, as the threat of sanc-
tions from above increased. In this context, the Minister for the Environment admitted  
“We are subject to infraction proceedings if we do not implement it in full, and 
non-compliance fines could run as high as £135,000 a day. (..) Those con-
straints are unavoidable, and we have delayed implementation as long as pos-
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 sible (...) we now risk fines and therefore have to act.” (Mr. Meacher in House of 
Commons 2002c: 906). 
 
The 2002 nitrates regulations were issued soon after the European Commission 
threatened the UK with financial penalties (House of Commons 2002c, Department of 
the Environment 2002b). The regulations of December 2002 had a broader applicatory 
scope than the 1996 nitrates regulations and included all fresh and groundwater, re-
gardless of whether it is intended for human consumption (House of Commons 2002e). 
While the Blair-government quickly introduced delayed compliance in order to prevent 
a second Court judgment and penalties, they pursued no comprehensive legal 
changes, but introduced a less demanding nitrates approach through the backdoor. 
Firstly, the government designated only 55% of the territory as NVZs, although the ma-
jority of farmers opted for 100% designation in the consultation procedure (mostly due 
to fairness considerations) (House of Commons 2001, Department of the Environment 
2002b). Moreover, the 2002 regulation and the NZVS and action programs entailed 
ambiguities. In particular, the government maintained considerable uncertainty as to 
which territories are subject to action programs and codes of good agricultural conduct 
(House of Commons 2002c).4
                                                
 
4  Another indicator for changes of strategic positions is the language governmental actors use 
in respect to nitrates. Although the Blair-government no longer claimed that the nitrates di-
rective applies exclusively to drinking water in 2002, none of the public speeches highlight 
the appropriateness, or rightfulness, or scientific properness of a demanding interpretation 
of the nitrates directive (House of Commons 2002b, House of Commons 2002a). Moreover, 
the framing was maintained and the government did not defend nitrates reduction as a 
measure of environmental protection, but still applied the public health and the costs frames 
(House of Commons 2002f, House of Commons 2002g). If environmental protection was 
mentioned at all in the context of the nitrates directive, even the DEFRA highlighted espe-
cially the merits of high drinking water quality (public health) or the effective uses of fertiliz-
ers (costs) (Department of the Environment 2002a). Rather than emphasizing environmental 
protection, the government focused on the domestic compliance costs (House of Commons 
2001, House of Commons 2002a: 426, House of Commons 2002b, House of Commons 
2002a, Select Committee on Environment 2002: 552; Select Committee on Environment 
2003: 14). 
 Most importantly, instead of recurring to normative or causal arguments and highlighting the 
superiority, the merits, or the quality of the nitrates directive or to a logic of appropriateness 
requiring compliance with EU law from good member states, the Blair-government repeat-
edly recurred to the ECJ and its 2000 ruling against the UK in a blame-shifting manner 
(House of Commons 2002h, House of Commons 2002d, House of Commons 2002e, House 
of Commons 2002f), such as “The Department's current proposals to reduce nitrate pollu-
tion from agriculture arise from the requirement to comply with the European Court of Jus-
tice judgment that implementation of the Nitrates Directive is currently incomplete in the UK” 
(House of Commons 2002d). These blame-shifting endeavors shifted the responsibility for 
domestic changes (against the preferences of the domestic clientele) to the EU. Through 
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The Environmental Impact Assessment directive (EIA, 1985/337) seeks to prevent en-
vironmental damages and prescribes a mandatory procedure for the evaluation of pro-
jects’ impacts on the environment. Only when a project is not regarded as significantly 
impacting the three media (air, water, and soil) it may be approved (Knill 2001: 144, 
147; Wurzel 2004: 103). The EIA directive did not fit to the German media-specific en-
vironmental law, since it resembled a cross-media approach and (Liefferink and Jordan 
2004: 37). The conservative/liberal German government transposed the directive with 
the 1990 environmental impact assessment law (UVPG), which restricted the applica-
tory scope of the EIA directive severely. Since the Kohl-government maintained their 
positions rigidly despite the Commission’s criticism, the later referred the case to the 
ECJ in 1995.  
 
Three issues were at stake in the judicial discourse, which failed in quickly transforming 
non-compliance into compliance. The European and German advocates developed no 
consensual norm definition. Except for the question on informational requirements, they 
either shared no judicial heuristic at all, or the shared heuristic fitted poorly to the inter-
pretational problem at hand. Thus, three years after the referral to the Court, the ECJ 
issued its ruling (European Court of Justice 1998: 45, 46).  
 
Directly after the ECJ ruling, the newly elected Social-democratic/Green government 
headed by chancellor Schröder continued non-compliance. Their substantial policy 
interests were already in line with compliance with a demanding EIA (Bundestag 1998, 
Bundestag 1996b, Bundestag 1996a). Hence, the government opted for a comprehen-
sive legal reform of the German body of environmental law via an environmental code 
(the UGB), of which the EIA directive as interpreted by the ECJ should have been an 
integral element (Trittin 1999, Trittin 2000), although such a comprehensive reform 
required additional time – during which non-compliance was continued. Yet, cost con-
siderations were less important for the government. Instead of highlighting compliance 
costs of the EIA directive (as the conservatives and the liberals did), the government 
argued that the EIA and an environmental code were rightful and appropriate 
(Bundesregierung 1999, Bundestag 1999a, Bundestag 1999b). In line with the expecta-
                                                                                                                                            
 
such two-level games, the Blair-government pacified the compliance-adverse public and the 
farmers and avoided electoral ex-post sanctions for their involuntary policy change. 
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 tion of the second hypothesis, the government did not adapt strategic positions to po-
tential financial sanctions, as long as the shadow of sanctions was weak and the Euro-
pean Commission abstained from sending a reasoned opinion based on Article 228 
ECT.  
 
The environmental code was never realized, not because of domestic veto players, but 
because of lacking federal competencies (e.g. Bundestag 2001: 16066). As a conse-
quence non-compliance prevailed several months after the comprehensive reform 
failed and the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice. The domestic com-
pliance constituency was not too strong, since environmental organizations preferred 
an UGB. At the same time, the industry strongly opposed the EIA for the cost implanta-
tions. Thus, domestic non-compliance benefits were moderately high and, nothing 
happened after the letter of formal notice, so that the European Commission issued a 
reasoned opinion based on Article 228 ECT in late 2000. In spring 2001, as the Ger-
man government had not yet legally transposed the directive, the European Commis-
sion suggested a daily penalty of 237 600€ a day (Bundestag 2001: 16076). The sec-
ond hypothesis expects that governments quickly pursue delayed compliance, if exter-
nal non-compliance costs exceed domestic compliance costs. In the EIA case, the 
threat of an RO 228 ECT changed strategic positions of the federal government, which 
quickly introduced delayed compliance. The SPD/Green government wanted to avoid a 
second ruling and financial penalties and, therefore, speeded up the process of legal 
change – although this led to the trade off of giving up the environmental code project 
as a comprehensive legal reform. The result was a compound patching-up law (‘Ar-
tikelgesetz’), which changed several pre-existing laws at once. It resembled a less de-
manding form of compliance than the comprehensive UBG. During the process of legal 
change, the government, and especially the Green environmental minister Mr Trittin 
continuously referred to the potential financial penalties and shifted the blame for mini-
malist legal changes to the EU-level (Bundesrat 2000: 625, Bundestag 2001: 16076, 
Bundestag 2001: 16066). Environmental organizations were fragmented and not co-
herently organized. Often they were specialized in one media (water, soil, air) rather 
than in cross-cutting issues and integrated approaches. Nevertheless, their majority 
preferred a comprehensive reform and consequently opposed narrow legal changes 
(BUND für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland 1999, DNR 2000, Greenpeace 1999, 
TAZ 1999). In this context, blaming the EU allowed the government to justify deviations 
from the comprehensive reform vis-à-vis its environmentalist clientele. In line with hy-
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 pothesis 2, a weak shadow of financial penalties after the ECJ ruling in 1998 had no 
effect and Germany maintained non-compliance. Yet, the German government became 
sensitive to external non-compliance costs as the threat of financial penalties grew in-
tense. After the European Commission proposed a daily sum as financial penalty, the 
government opted for delayed compliance and, thereby, compromised substantial pol-
icy interests and the support of environmental organizations (opted for a UGB) and the 
industry (opted for non-compliance).. Thus, the government abandoned the environ-
mental code project as a comprehensive reform, since this would have required a con-
stitutional change and, in the meantime, the maintenance of non-compliance and pen-
alties from the EU-level. 
 
Both cases support the second hypothesis, according to which judgments can only be 
enforced with the threat of sanctions, if external non-compliance costs exceed domes-
tic non-compliance benefits. This is influenced by the density of shadow of sanctions, 
which darkens if the government is most likely to be punished while being still in office 
on the one hand, and by the domestic non-compliance benefits, which depend on con-
crete or diffuse cost benefits implications of the policy in question on the other hand 
(Wilson 1980) and the organizational strength of the constituency and its relation to the 
government. The UK nitrates case and the German EIA case are both instances, in 
which governments opted non-compliance after the ECJ judgments. In both cases, 
domestic non-compliance constituencies were strong so that the letter of formal notice 
was no sufficient threat to induce delayed compliance. The Blair government would 
have maintained non-compliance and saved domestic compliance costs for their clien-
tele, if the threat of sanctions has not been applied. Only as the Commission suggested 
a daily sum as penalty to the ECJ, external non-compliance costs overrode domestic 
non-compliance benefits and the UK opted for delayed compliance. Similar in the Ger-
man case, where the Schröder government would have continued non-compliance 
(until federal competencies were reformed so that the UGB project would have been 
possible), had not the European Commission with the threat of penalties risen the non-
compliance costs to a prohibitive extent so that delayed compliance was pursued. In 
both instances, the governments adapted legal acts in a manner that compromised 
their substantial policy interests in order to avoid a second ECJ judgment and penal-
ties.  While it took two years after the judgment, until compliance was restored in the 
UK nitrates case, the German EIA case needed three years. Yet, in the end, both 
states complied with the formerly severely contested directives. 
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The most different systems design allows excluding alternative explanations. Country-
specific variables cannot explain transformational dynamics. This is because Germany 
and the UK differ in the political, financial and administrative capacities, in the political 
and legal cultures, and the support of EU-integration, but nevertheless reveal very simi-
lar settlement dynamics. This indicates that non-compliance cases of all states can be 
transformed into compliance, as long as the international institutions have a toolbox 
which allows for threats with sanctions.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Non-compliance with European law impairs its effectiveness. This is the more sever, 
the longer the duration of time is, in which a state violates EU laws. Therefore, this pa-
per focused on the question, why after the ECJ referral some cases can be settled ear-
lier in than others. Why is it that every state has instances of settlements within the first 
two years after the ECJ referral, while there are also cases, which require six additional 
years, until non-compliance can be abolished?  
 
The paper demonstrated that early settlements are due to successful judicial dis-
courses, while delayed settlements that take place four years or longer after the ECJ 
referral are due to judgments which the European Commission and the ECJ seek to 
enforce with threats of sanctions. Since the institutional design of the EU infringement 
procedure is constant and since all compliance restoring mechanisms are applied in 
the same order in every Court case, neither the presence nor the application of the 
compliance mechanisms explain their differential success. So why is it that judicial dis-
courses succeed sometimes, but fail in other instances even vis-à-vis the same gov-
ernment?  
 
This paper theoretically and empirically demonstrated that states abolish non-
compliance quickly after the ECJ referral, if the advocates in the judicial discourse do 
not talk cross-purposes but develop a consensual norm definition. This requires that 
the actors apply a common judicial method of interpretation that fits to the interpreta-
tional problem at hand. The British collective redundancy and the German drinking wa-
ter cases exemplified that successful judicial discourses quickly abolish non-
 28
 compliance. Yet, as the UK nitrates and the German environmental impact assessment 
cases indicate, if judicial discourses fail, non-compliance is maintained for an additional 
time period. Judgments as such do not threaten states with increasing top-down non-
compliance costs, but they can be enforced with a threat of sanctions, if states maintain 
non-compliance for more than a year after the ECJ ruling. The shadow of sanctions 
darkens severely, if the Commission not only sends a second letter of formal notice, 
but also a second reasoned opinion. After that, it is very likely that the government will 
still be in office and subject to financial penalties, if non-compliance will be maintained. 
Only than, external non-compliance costs become prohibitive and exceed domestic 
non-compliance benefits, so that the governments opt for delayed compliance.  
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detection (expiration date for transposi-
tion-letter of formal notice) 
10 5 4 3 
Duration of the managerial phase  
(RO 226- ECJ referral) 
1 2 1 4 
Duration of the judicial discourse  
(ECJ referral-judgment) 
2 2 1 3 
Duration of non-compliance between 
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This paper demonstrated that compliance with international law can be restored by 
international courts, even against the will of states and although a legitimate monopoly 
of force is lacking for international courts. Policy-variables provide crucial scope condi-
tions, while state characteristics have no significant effect on the operation and suc-
cess of compliance restoring instruments. However, one and the same instrument is 
sometimes successful, but fails in other instances, even within the EU, even for one 
and the same state, and even for one and the same government. As a consequence, 
the proper mix of tools is essential for a political and legal community. Although it might 
take up to 15 years until compliance with European law is finally achieved, in the end 
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 all states comply. This is good news for the effectiveness of international law– as long 
as international institutions entail judicial discourses, judgments, and threats of sanc-





Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne Marie Slaughter 
and Duncan Snidal (2000) The Concept of Legalization, International Organiza-
tion, 54, 3, 401-19. 
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000) Hard and Soft Law in International Gov-
ernance, International Organization, 54, 3, 421-56. 
Advocate General (1992) Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs on February 12th 
1992. Incorrect Legal Transpotision of Directive 80/778 by the Federal Republic 
of Germany; C-237/90, Sammlung der Rechtssprechung, 1992, I-05973. 
Advocate General (1994) Opinion of the Advocate General Van Gerven on March 2nd 
1994. Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great 
Britian and Northern Ireland, Incorrect Legal Transposition of Directive 75/129, 
Case C-237/90. Safeguaring of Employees' Rights in the Event of CollectiveR-
edundancies, Sammlung der Rechtssprechung, 1994, I-02435. 
Advocate General (2000) Opinion of the Advocate General Leger on July 13th, 2000. 
Incorrect Legal Transpotision of Directive 91/676 by the United Kingdom; C-
69/99, Sammlung der Rechtssprechung, 2000, I-10979. 
Alexy, Robert (1983) Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationa-
len Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
Ashford, Douglas E. (1981) Policy and Politics in Britain. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Uni-
versity Press. 
Bayern (1992) Antrag 24.09.1992. 
Belfast Newsletter (2001) Britain in the Docks. In Belfast Newsletter. Belfast. 
Börzel, Tanja A. (2003) Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union. 
Why There is (Not) a Southern Problem. London: Ashgate. 
Börzel, Tanja A., Meike Dudziak, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke and Carina Sprungk 
(2007) Recalcitrance, Inefficiency, and Support for European Integration:Why 
Member States do (not) Comply with European Law, Harvard University. Center 
for European Studies Working Paper Series, No. 148. 
Börzel, Tanja A., Tobias Hofmann and Diana Panke (2005) Who’s Afraid of the ECJ? 
Member States, Court Referrals, and (Non-) Compliance. In Paper prepared for 
the ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, April 14-19, 2005. Berlin. 
BUND für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (1999) Waffengleichheit für Umwelt-
nützer und -schützer, BUND Pressearchiv, 04/03. 
Bundesrat (1992) Plenarprotokoll 25.09.1992. 
Bundesrat (2000) Plenarprotokoll vom 21.12.2000. 
 30
 Bundesratsausschuss für Gesundheit (1992) Empfehlungen zur Allgemeinen Verwal-
tungsvorschrift über Trinkwasser, 14.09.1992. 
Bundesregierung (1988) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine kleine Anfrage der Ab-
geordneten Frau Kiehm und der Fraktion der SPD - Schadstoffbelastung Was-
ser, 11/2285. 
Bundesregierung (1993) Antwort Bundesregierung; BMG (federführend) 18.01.1993. 
Wasserversorgung; Trinkwasser; Abwasser, 12/4143. 
Bundesregierung (1994) Unterrichtung der Bundesregierung 06.09.1994. Politik für 
eine nachhaltige, umweltgerechte Entwicklung. 
Bundesregierung (1999) Plenarprotokoll vom 08.10.1999. Schriftliche Antwort Simone 
Probst, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Na-
turschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 08.10.1999. 
Bundestag (1987) Plenarprotokoll vom 08.10.1987. 
Bundestag (1988a) Plenarprotokoll  vom 14.04.1988. 
Bundestag (1988b) Plenarprotokoll vom 15.04.1988. 
Bundestag (1988c) Plenarprotokoll vom 19.08.1988. 
Bundestag (1988d) Plenarprotokoll vom 27.10.1988. 
Bundestag (1989) Plenarprotokoll  vom 16.06.1989. Anfrage zur Trinkwassergefähr-
dung furch militärische Altlasten. 
Bundestag (1990) Plenarprotokoll vom 14.02.1990. 
Bundestag (1991a) Plenarprotokoll 12/64 vom 05.12.1991. 
Bundestag (1991b) Plenarprotokoll  vom 05.12.1991. 
Bundestag (1991c) Plenarprotokoll  vom 12.03.1991. 
Bundestag (1992) Plenarprotokoll vom 24.11.1992. 
Bundestag (1993a) Plenarprotokoll  vom 22.04.1993. 
Bundestag (1993b) Plenarprotokoll vom 14.01.1993. 
Bundestag (1994a) Plenarprotokoll  vom 21.09.1994. 
Bundestag (1994b) Plenarprotokoll  vom 23.06.1994. 
Bundestag (1994c) Plenarprotokoll  vom 27.05.1994. 
Bundestag (1996a) Plenarprotokoll vom 05.06.1993. Anfrage zu Stand der Arbeiten am 
Umweltgesetzbuch, SPD. 
Bundestag (1996b) Plenarprotokoll vom 27.06.1996. 
Bundestag (1998) Plenarprotokoll vom 05.03.1998. 
Bundestag (1999a) Plenarprotokoll vom 08.10.1999. Fragestunde. Notwendigkeit einer 
Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung wegen Nichtumsetzung der EU-
Änderungsrichtlinie; Wettbewerbsnachteile deutscher Unternehmen. 
Bundestag (1999b) Plenarprotokoll vom 19.11.1999. Fragestunde. Umweltverträglich-
keitsprüfung für die Nordumfahrung der Hörselberge (Thüringen) im Zuge der A 
4. 
Bundestag (2001) Plenarprotokoll vom 05.04.2001. 
Commission of the European Communities (2005) Communication from the Commis-
sion. Application of Article 228 of the EC Treaty. SEC (205) 1658. Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities. 
 31
 Department of the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, (2002a) News Release - Ni-
trate Controls to Spearhead Long-Term Strategy to Improve Water Quality. 
Department of the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, (2002b) Nitrates Directive 
Consultation. A Report Prepared by NOP Social & Political for teh Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 
DNR (2000) DNR Deutschland Rundbrief. Naturschutz und Umweltpolitik auf Bundes-
ebene. In. Bonn. 
Docksey, Christopher (1986) Information and Consultation of Employees: The United 
Kingdom and the Vredeling Directive, The Modern Law Review, 49, 3, 281-313. 
European Commission (1991) Report by the Commission to the Council on Progress 
with Regard to Implementation of the Directive on the Approximation of the 
Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies (Council Direc-
tive75/129/EEC of 17February1975), 51991SC1639, /*SEC/91/1639FINAL. 
Brussels: European Communities. 
European Court of Justice (1992) Court Judgment of November 24th 1992. European 
Commission Against the Federal Republic of Germany Regarding the Incom-
plete Legal Transposition of Directive 80/778; C-237-90, Sammlung der 
Rechtsprechung, 1992, I-05973. 
European Court of Justice (1994) Court Judgment of June 8th 1994. European Com-
mission Against the United Kingdom Regarding the Incomplete Legal Transpo-
sition of Directive 75/129, C-383/92, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung, 1994, I-
02479. 
European Court of Justice (1998) Court Judgment of October 22th 1998. European 
Commission Against the Federal Republic of Germany Regarding the Incom-
plete Legal Transposition of Directie 85/337, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung, 
C-301-95, I-06135. 
European Court of Justice (2000) Court Judgment of December 7th, 2000.  The Euro-
pean Commission Against the United Kingdom Regarding the Incomplete Appli-
cation of Directive 91/676, C-69/99, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung, 2000, I-
10979. 
Farmers Guardian (2000) Revised Crop Input Recommendations. In Farmers Guard-
ian. London. 
Farmers Guardian (2001) Britain in Dock Over Nitrates. In Farmers Guardian. London. 
Fearon, James (1998) Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, Inter-
national Organization, 52, 2, 269-305. 
Federal Ministry for Health (1992) Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zu Trinkwasser, 
09.07.1992. 
Financial Times (2002a) Government to Implement EU Water Directive. In Financial 
Times. London. 
Financial Times (2002b) Nitrate Pollution Zones 'Will Cover Only 55% of UK'. In Finan-
cial Times. London. 
Greenpeace (1999) Umweltminister Tritin macht es seinen Gegnern in Industrie und 
Politik zu leicht, Greenpeace Magazin, 99, 4, 1-3. 
 32
 Habermas, Jürgen (1992) Handlungen. Sprechakte, Sprachlich Vermittelte Interaktion 
und Lebenswelt. In Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Nachmetaphysisches Denken - Phi-
losophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1995a) Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1 Hand-
lungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1995b) Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2 zur Kritik 
der funktionalistischen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Henkin, Louis (1968) How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press. 
Horne, Christine and Anna Cutlip (2002) Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement, 
Rationality and Society, 14, 3, 285-307. 
House of Commons (1989) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 July 1989. 
House of Commons (1991) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 7 May 1991. 
House of Commons (1992) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 November 
1992. 
House of Commons (1993) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 February 
1993. 
House of Commons (1994a) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 7 February 
1994. 
House of Commons (1994b) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 11 March 1994. 
House of Commons (1996a) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 February 
1996. 
House of Commons (1996b) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 14 October 
1996. 
House of Commons (1997) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 23 July 1997. 
House of Commons (1999) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 20 October 1999. 
House of Commons (2000) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10 February 
2000. 
House of Commons (2001) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 December 
2001. Commons Written Answers. 
House of Commons (2002a) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 12 December 
2002. 
House of Commons (2002b) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 14 May 2002. 
House of Commons (2002c) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 16 May 2002. 
House of Commons (2002d) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 28 January 
2002. Commons Written Answers. 
House of Commons (2002e) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 30 January 
2002. Commons Written Answers. 
House of Commons (2002f) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 30 January 
2002. Commons Written Answers. 
House of Commons (2002g) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 31 January 
2002. 
 33
 House of Commons (2002h) House of Commons Hansard Debates for 31 January 
2002. Commons Written Answers. 
House of Lords (2001) House of Lords Debates, Lords Written Answers. 20 December 
2001. 
Knill, Christoph (2001) The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of 
Institutional Change and Persistence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Liefferink, Duncan and Andrew Jordan (2004) Measuring Europeanization of Policy 
Convergence. National Baseline Conditions. In Andrew Jordan and Duncan 
Liefferink (eds.), Environmental Policy in Europe. The Europeanization of Na-
tional Environmental Policy. London: Routledge. 
Mitchell, Ronald (1996) Compliance Theory: An Overview. In J. Cameron und J. 
Werksman und P. Roderick (ed.), Improving Compliance with International Envi-
ronmental Law. London: Earthscan. 
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social The-
ory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Panke, Diana (2006a) The Differential Impact of Communicated Ideas. Bridging the 
Gap between Rationalism and Constructivism, hamburg review of social sci-
ences, 1, 3, 312-42. 
Panke, Diana (2006b) Why Big States Cannot Do What They Want. International 
Courts and Compliance. In Paper presented at the Law & Society Conference, 




Panke, Diana (2007) The European Court of Justice as an Agent of Europeanization? 
Restoring Compliance with EU Law, Journal of European Public Policy. 
Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2002) Select Committee on 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Select Committee Report. Memorandum 
submitted by Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Examination 
of Witnesses. 11 December 2002. 
Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2003) Select Committee on 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Select Committee Report. Appendices to 
the Minutes of Evidence. 12 March 2003. 
Smith, James McCall (2000) The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Le-
galism in Regional Trade Pacts, International Organization, 54, 1, 137-80. 
TAZ (1999) Der Sachverstaendige Gerd Winter zur weiteren Verschiebung des Um-
weltgesetzbuches. "Den Interessen der Industrie nachgegeben". In TAZ. Frank-
furt. 
The Daily Telegraph (2000) EU Red Tape 'Is Ruining Our Farmers' Task Force Blames 
'Over-Zealous' Britain. In The Daily Telegraph. London. 
The Daily Telegraph (2001) Farmers Are Hit by European Curb on Muck Spreading. In 
The Daily Telegraph. London. 
The Express (2001a) GBP 1BN Clean-Up Cost of Water Pollution by Farm Pesiticides. 
In The Express. London. 
The Express (2001b) GBP 50M Pollution Price. In The Express. London. 
 34
 Trittin, Jürgen (1999) Perspektiven der deutschen Umweltpolitik. In Speech in the 
German Bundestag, 29.09.1999. Berlin: Speech in the German Bundestag, 
29.09.1999, 18th Session of the Committee on Environment, Nature and Nu-
clear Safety. 
Trittin, Jürgen (2000) Die ökologische Erneuerung der Bundesrepublik. Speech at the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation. In. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll Stiftung. 
Western Daily Press (2002) Bid to Cut River Pollution. In Western Daily Press. Ply-
mouth. 
Wilson, James Q. (1975) Political Organization. New York: Basic Books. 
Wilson, James Q. (ed.) (1980) The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books. 
Wurzel, Rüdiger K.W. (2004) Germany. From Environmental Leadership to Partical 
Mismatch. In Andrew Jordan and Duncan Lieferink (eds.), Environmental Policy 




 Berliner Arbeitspapiere zur Europäischen Integration 
Berlin Working Paper on European Integration 
 
1 Tanja A. Börzel: European Governance. Verhandlungen und Wettbewerb im 
Schatten der Hierarchie, April 2007 
2 Franziska Süllke: Young People and Active European Citizenship. Strengthe-
ning Opportunities for Citizenship Education on a Local Level. Examples from 
Practice under Difficult Conditions, Mai 2007 
3 Sabine von Oppeln: Das Europäische Sozialmodell. Bilanz und Perspektiven, 
September 2007 
4 Diana Panke: Why the ECJ Restores Compliance Faster in Some Cases Than 
in Others. Comparing Germany and the UK, Oktober 2007 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 36
